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This In Brief examines some of the zombie ideas 
around Chinese influence in the Pacific, which were 
reanimated by the November 2014 visit of President 
Xi Jinping to Fiji. I use the term ‘zombie ideas’ 
because of the persistence of these ideas, long after 
the creators of these myths have either left the field 
or repudiated their earlier positions. Before Xi’s visit, 
I outlined four myths about China in the Pacific that 
were likely to stalk the media (Smith 2014):
1. China has a strong diplomatic presence in the Pacific.
2. China’s development assistance is linked to resources.
3. China’s development assistance, trade and invest-
ment are used to support undemocratic regimes.
4. China’s leaders have closer ties to Pacific elites 
than Western leaders.
A piece from the leading wire service Bloomberg 
(Shi 2014) provides a useful framework for examin-
ing these persistent misconceptions about China’s 
presence in the Pacific. 
The journalist found a bona fide China expert, 
Professor Kerry Brown, to support the first myth. He 
argued that ‘because of their strategic regional loca-
tion, [China] is starting to regard [the Pacific Islands] 
as increasingly in its own backyard as it aspires to 
become a naval power’. A naval power with a sin-
gle aircraft carrier and no bases is on the aspiring 
side, but, to date, China has a small footprint in the 
South Pacific: few diplomats, no permanent mili-
tary presence and relatively limited aid, trade and 
investment in comparison to other regions (Smith 
2014). According to China’s second Aid White Paper, 
development assistance to the Pacific makes up 4.2 
per cent of China’s total outlays (Zhang 2014), while 
outbound direct investment stock is less than two per 
cent, largely made up of a single project — the Ramu 
nickel mine in Papua New Guinea (Smith et al. 2014).
The article conflates China’s belligerent actions in 
the South China Sea with its behaviour in the South 
Pacific, assuming that the Chinese state behaves in the 
same manner everywhere around the globe. This miss-
es the point that there is far less at stake in the South 
Pacific, so China’s representatives behave differently. 
This point is elegantly made in a recent piece that com-
pares the unilateral actions of Chinese state actors in 
the South China Sea with their multilateral approach 
to dispute resolution in the Arctic (Taylor 2014).
In the first sentence of the Bloomberg piece we 
are told that trade figures prove that China gave 
special treatment to the Bainimarama regime in 
the aftermath of the ‘putsch’ of 2006: ‘President Xi 
Jinping arrived in Fiji today to expand relations 
beyond trade that has quadrupled since then-army 
chief Frank Bainimarama staged a coup almost eight 
years ago’. This sounds like strong evidence that 
China manipulates trade flows to support undemo-
cratic regimes, unless you realise that China’s trade 
with the Pacific as a whole — including the six 
nations that recognise Taiwan — also quadrupled 
over the past eight years (Smith et al. 2014). Trade 
with Fiji’s nearest neighbours, Tonga and Samoa, 
has increased sixfold and sevenfold respectively.
Even if one accepts the notion that the Chinese 
state wants to influence which regions its companies 
trade and invest in, the numbers don’t support the 
proposition that China is set on increasing its ‘eco-
nomic clout’ in the South Pacific. In 2013, China’s 
trade with Pacific countries was worth US$4.42 bil-
lion — considerably less than Australia’s trade with 
PNG, and accounting for 0.12 per cent of its total 
trade volume. By comparison, China’s trade with 
Africa stood at US$210 billion — comfortably more 
than that continent’s trade with any of its former 
colonial powers. As China’s Blue Book of Oceania 
summarised, ‘China and the Pacific Islands have a 
low level of economic interdependence’ (Yu 2014).
The piece follows good journalistic practice by 
interviewing a couple of Chinese analysts, who let 
loose a few ‘made in China’ zombies. Shen Shishun, 
of the China Institute of International Studies, 
offers that small Pacific nations can’t ‘have their 
cake and eat it too’, implying that these nations 
are losing out materially by recognising Taiwan. 
The disastrous slide of Taiwan’s ruling Nationalist 
Party (KMT) in the November local elections may 
mean that diplomatic competition between China 
and Taiwan in the South Pacific could be back on 
the agenda as soon as 2016, when the leader of the 
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pro-independence Democratic People’s Party may 
become the new president of Taiwan.
However, South Pacific nations that recognise 
Taiwan, from Solomon Islands and Kiribati to Nauru 
and Tuvalu, do have their cake and eat it. Chinese 
trade and investment with these nations is boom-
ing. According to researchers from Sun Yat-Sen Uni-
versity’s Center for Oceanian Studies, China trades 
more with the countries in the region that recognise 
Taiwan than with those that recognise the People’s 
Republic, enjoying high trade volumes with the Mar-
shall Islands and Solomon Islands (Yu 2014, 15). 
The aim of this In Brief is not to condemn the 
article, but to alert policy-makers to the danger of 
accepting assertions about China’s influence in the 
South Pacific, simply because they are repeated in 
the mainstream media. Nor do I wish to argue that 
Chinese officials are above a bit of mischief.
The Fiji visit was Xi Jinping’s first tour as presi-
dent, but although the Bloomberg article describes it 
as his first tour of the South Pacific, he visited Fiji in 
February 2009 when he was vice-president — a visit 
the Chinese side initially tried to conceal from Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. Subsequent Chinese media 
reports referred to the two-day visit as a ‘transit 
stopover’, while according it more ink than the aver-
age official state visit, right down to ‘China highly 
appreciates Fiji’s adherence to the one-China policy’ 
(Xinhua 2009).
Given that the Bloomberg article tries to create 
an impression of menace, the author’s ignorance 
of this incident is unfortunate, as it is one instance 
where Chinese state actors clearly were up to a bit of 
mischief in the South Pacific. Wikileaks cables reveal 
just how perturbed Australia’s officials were at the 
time, with diplomat Robert Fergusson briefing a US 
official that ‘the PRC would have known that the Xi 
visit and its results would be contrary to the hard-
won Pacific [Islands] Forum consensus [to isolate 
the Bainimarama regime]’ (Morgan 2011). 
Ultimately, sanctions and isolation proved ineffect-
ive and speeches by Xi and Bainimarama were laced 
with references to true friendship in adversity. Chinese 
media reports of Xi inviting Pacific leaders to get on 
board China’s ‘development express train’ (Xinhua 
2014) alarmed some sections of Australia’s media. 
However, it would be a mistake to confuse the 
rhetoric of close ties with Pacific elites with the 
reality. Whatever impression some Pacific leaders 
may wish to convey to Australia and New Zealand’s 
leaders, the region’s trade, investment and military 
ties with China suggest the South Pacific is a long 
way from becoming China’s backyard any time soon.
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